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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants/Appellees.

:

Case No. 90- 0241

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

(Priority No. 16)

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through
counsel John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal
Clinic pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
submits the following BRIEF in support of his appeal:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff appeals an order of sanctions awarding
attorney fees for an alleged violation of Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff unilaterally dismissed this case under Rule
41 (a)(l)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on SeptemI
ber 11, 1989. No objection has ever been raised to that
dismissal.

Thereafter, on January 10, 1990 defendants moved

for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil

1

Procedure.

Plaintiff responded with a Memorandum and his

first affidavit.
On February 2, 1990 the trial court granted defendants1
request for sanctions and directed them to file an
itemization of fees incurred and authorized plaintiff to
file an objection.
Defendants itemized their fees to the Court by affidavit on February 16, 1990 and the plaintiff objected on
February 26, 1990. As part of that objection plaintiff
filed a second affidavit and the affidavits of eight (8)
practicing Salt Lake City attorneys (hereinafter "attorney
affidavits11).

The trial court overruled plaintifffs ob-

jection, and upon defendants1 motion struck the bulk of
plaintiff's second affidavit and his objection and struck
all the attorney affidavits.
On March 22, 1990 plaintiff moved for a new trial and
in support thereof re-submitted his objection, his second
affidavit and the attorney affidavits.

That objection and

all affidavits were before the Court when it considered
plaintiff's motion for new trial.

That motion for a new

trial was denied.
The Court entered an order and judgment assessing
attorney fees against the plaintiff in the sum of $4,381.00
on April 23, 1990. A timely appeal was filed on May 3,
1990.

2

Plaintifffs motion for a summary reversal on appeal was
denied by this Court on June 19, 1990,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As of July 19, 1990, the Third District Court Deputy
Clerk in charge of appeals had not indexed or paginated the
official record from the proceedings below.

Consequently,

reference to particular pages of the trial record is impossible.

For this Court's convenience, plaintiff has attached

as exhibits the documents most heavily relied upon in
plaintifff s arguments.
1.

Plaintiff filed the complaint herein against the

Utah State Bar and Assistant Bar Counsel, Toni Marie Sutliff
on August 2, 1989 (Exhibit "A"),
2.

After defendants filed a motion to dismiss, plain-

tiff on September 11, 1989, voluntarily dismissed this
action pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(l)(i) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3.

The action below was dismissed as moot because

defendants provided plaintiff the relief he sought -- the
defendants identified the members of the Screening Panel to
which plaintiff's pending disciplinary matter was assigned
and revealed the procedure for assignment of a disciplinary
complaint to a Screening Panel.
4.

No objection has been made to that dismissal.
3

5.
missed.

The Court below considered the case to be disJudge Hanson acknowledged (Memorandum Decision,

Exhibit "L", February 12, 1990, p. 4) that the plaintiff
voluntarily and unilaterally dismissed this suit.
6.

On January 10, 1990, defendants filed a motion

seeking, among other things, sanctions under Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter "Rule llff)
alleging, among other things, that the Third Judicial
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiff's dismissed claims.
7.

The plaintiff responded by filing his first affida-

vit (Exhibit lfBfI) and a memorandum in opposition.
8.

The trial court herein, the Hon. Tim Hanson, judge

presiding, ruled that plaintiff violated Rule 11 by filing
the complaint in the Third District Court instead of in the
Utah Supreme Court (Order of February 12, 1990 attached as
Exhibit "L").

The trial court determined that because

plaintiff's action questioned the Bar's "governance of the
practice of law" and related to disciplinary procedures of
the Bar that a district court had no subject matter jurisdiction.
9.

The Court below directed defendants to itemize

their attorney fees and recited that plaintiff could file a
further objection when the itemization was presented.
10.

On February 16, 1990, defendants filed their

itemization of attorney fees.

On February 26, 1990,
4

plaintiff filed his objection along with a second affidavit
(Exhibit "C") and the attorney affidavits regarding the
legal research of those attorneys as to the status of the
law vis-a-vis jurisdiction of the District Court in a case
such as this.

(Affidavits of James Ausenbaugh, John B.

Maycock, Robert Breeze, G. Stephen Sullivan, Kevin Anderson,
Ross Anderson, Gary Ferguson, and Mark Gustavson (Exhibits
"D" - "K")).

Plaintiff also requested that the trial Court

take judicial notice of certain cases filed in the Third
Judicial District Court.
11.

The attorney affidavits establish that the law is

not clear that a District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving the Utah State Bar, its policies, agents and employees (see Exhibit "D" - "K").
12.

The two (2) uncontroverted affidavits of plaintiff

detail underlying facts (Exhibit

,f

B") and the research

(Exhibit ffCfl) completed prior to filing the complaint as to
subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving the Utah

1. Plaintiff calls this Court's attention to a rule making
petition he filed in this Court (No. 89-0423, filed September 27, 1989) in which he asked this Court by rule making to
determine and/or clarify the correct court in which to file
adversary actions against the Bar and Bar Counsel questioning disciplinary actions or procedures. That petition
resulted from the Bar's claims of immunity from suit in such
actions, as well as its claim that the Supreme Court has
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear such adversary
matters.

5

State Bar, its policies, agents and its governance of the
practice of law.
13.

The cases which plaintiff asked the Court to

judicially note establish that two (2) judges of the Third
Judicial District Court previously exercised subject matter
jurisdiction over the Utah State Bar, its employees, and its
governance of the practice of law (discussed infra, Point I,
§§ A, B ) .
14.

The Court below struck the bulk of the plaintiff's

objection, his second affidavit and the attorney affidavits
and thus did not consider them as part of the plaintiff's
objection.
15.

Order of March 14, 1990, Exhibit "M".

A final order and a judgment were entered on April

23, 1990 awarding attorney fees of $4,381.00 under Rule 11
to the defendants (Exhibits "N" & "0").
16.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial on March 22, 1990

pursuant to Rule 52(b), Rule 59 and Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v.
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, 767 P.2d 125, 99 Ut. Adv. Rep.
25 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).

In support of that motion plaintiff

re-submitted his objection, his second affidavit and the
attorney affidavits.

That objection and all ten (10)

affidavits were before the Court when it considered plaintiff's motion for new trial.
17.

The trial court: declined to grant a new trial to

reconsider its ruling (Order of May 2, 1990, attached as

6

Exhibit "P").

The trial court also declined to make find-

ings to support its ruling (id,).
18.

On May 3, 1990, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal

herein (Exhibit "Q").

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiff did not violate Rule 11 in filing an
action challenging conduct and policies of the Utah State
Bar and its Assistant Bar Counsel in the Third Judicial
District Court instead of in this Court.

The law is unclear

that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over this action.

Plaintiff made a reasonable pre-filing

investigation as to the law.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY IMPOSING RULE 11
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.

A. Plaintiff's Conduct Did Not Warrant Rule 11
Sanctions.
Sanctions under Rule 11 are inappropriate where there
are differing interpretations of the law or where contrary
controlling authority is not obvious.

0'Connell v. Champion

Int'1 Corp., 812 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1987); Kamen v. Amer.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, (2nd Cir. 1986);

7

Federal

Deposit Ins, Co, v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir.
1986),

The party seeking Rule 11 sanctions is burdened with

showing that the filing party pursued the litigation in bad
faith or brought a frivolous, unreasonable or groundless
action.

See U,S, Industries, Inc, v. Touche Ross & Co,, 854

F.2d 1223, 1241 (10th Cir. 1988).

A simple showing that the

filing party did not prevail is not enough to justify Rule
11 sanctions.

Id.

The Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit declared:
The standard developed by courts for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11 is stringent because such
sanctions 1) are "in derogation of the general
American policy of encouraging resort to the
courts for peaceful resolution of disputes,"
Eastway Construction Corp, v. City of New York,
637 F,Supp, 558, 564 (E.D.NY. 1986), modifiecTand
remanded, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert denied
U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987); I)
tend to "spawn satellite litigation counterproductive to efficient disposition of cases," Gaiardo
[v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir.
1987)]; and 3) "increase tensions among the
litigating bar and between the bench and the bar."
Eastway Construction Corp., 637 F.Supp. at 564.
Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d
191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988).
In considering sanctions under Rule 11, courts are to
resolve ambiguities in favor of the filing party, and if
there are differing opinions concerning the merits,
sanctions should not be applied.

Oliveri v. Thompson, 803

F.2d 1265, 1275 (2nd Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut.
Liab, Ins, Co,, 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986); Eavenson,
Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3rd Cir.
8

1985); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d
177 (7th Cir. 1985)•

ff

[W]hen issues are close, the invoca-

tion of Rule 11 borders on the abusive: We caution
litigants that Rule 11 is not to be used routinely when the
parties disagree about the correct resolution of a matter in
litigation.

Rule 11 is intended for only exceptional

circumstances."

Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479 (3d

Cir. 1987) (quotes and cites omitted).

See Doering, 857

F.2d at 194 (the primary purpose of Rule 11 is "deterrence
of abuses of the legal system.")
Plaintiff's filing his action in the District Court was
neither so abusive of the legal system, nor exceptionally
reprehensible to warrant Rule 11 sanctions.

There is no

clear law that holds that a Utah District Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over matters involving the Utah
State Bar, its agents and its governance of the practice of
law in Utah (see § II, infra (constitutional and statutory
research compels an opposite conclusion)).

In fact, two (2)

judges of the Third Judicial District Court have found that
the district court has jurisdiction over the policies and
actions of the Utah State Bar and its regulation of the
practice of law.

See

R. Owen Neerin^s v. Utah State Bar,

et al, Case No. 88-3807 (Judge Sawaya); Barnard v. Utah
State Bar and Hutchinson, Case No. 88-0578, (Judge H.
Wilkinson).

Further, plaintiff in preparing this case could

find no law that prohibited the filing in district court
9

(Exhibits "B" & "C") . Finally, eight (8) other Salt Lake
City attorneys, researched the issue and concluded that the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case
(Exhibits

,, ,, ,f ,f

D - K ).

Any law requiring the original filing of this action in
the Supreme Court is not so obvious and clear as to warrant
Rule 11 sanctions•

B.

Plaintiff Conducted Extensive Pre-Filing Research.

Rule 11 requires a reasonable inquiry into the status
of the law upon which an action is based.

It is certainly

not necessary, however, for plaintiff to cite authority for
his claims in his Verified Complaint.

See e.g., Ault v.

Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert, denied 109 S.Ct. 1532.
Here, plaintiff made a reasonable pre-filing investigation as to the the law regarding the jurisdiction of the
District Court.
n

C")).

(Plaintifffs Second Affidavit (Exhibit

That uncontroverted affidavit establishes more than

a reasonable pre-filing investigation.

Plaintiff relied, in

part, upon prior rulings of judges of the Salt Lake County
Third Judicial District Court, in which they exercised
jurisdiction over the Bar, its agents and policies.
Prior to this case, plaintiff personally filed two (2)
pro se actions in District Court regarding the governance of
the practice of law, regulation of attorneys and actions of
10

the Utah State Bar, Barnard v, Utah State Bar and
Hutchinson, Case No. 88-0578, (Judge H. Wilkinson), and,
Barnard v. Hutchinson and Utah State Bar, Case No. 88-0801
(Judge P. Brian).

Both of these cases involve the "gover-

nance of the practice of law,11 the operations of the Utah
State Bar and the regulation of attorneys.

In both actions,

employees of the Bar are defendants and the Bar's governance
of the practice of law was challenged.
In Third District Court Case No. 88-0801, Judge P.
Brian has not ruled upon the defendantsf affirmative defense
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Ut. Const. VIII,
§ 4.

That case is still pending but action has been stayed

awaiting a decision by this Court in Barnard v. Utah State
Bar, Case No. 88-0578 (Supreme Court Case No. 88-0201).
I
In Barnard v. Utah State Bar, Third District Court Case
No. 88-0578, (now on appeal to this Court as Case No. 880201, argued to this Court on December 5, 1989) Judge H.
Wilkinson denied the defendantsf affirmative defense to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Ut. Const. Art. VIII,
§ 4 (the same basis as defendants' motion herein).

In that

case, Judge Wilkinson found the District Court to have
jurisdiction over the Utah State Bar and determined that Ut.
Const. Art. VIII, § 4 did not preclude such an action in
District Court.

That case dealt with the operations of the

Utah State Bar and whether it must publically reveal the
salaries of its employees.
11

Plaintiff herein represented R. Neerings in the case of
R. Owen Neerings v. Utah State Bar, et al, Case No. 88-3807
(Judge Sawaya, filed June, 1988) in the Third District
Court.

That case dealt with the admission process of the

Utah State Bar, and the bar exam and the privacy of bar exam
2
results.
Judge J. Sawaya found the District Court had
jurisdiction, and in early 1989, resolved the case on its
merits granting summary judgment to the Bar defendants.
(That case is now before this Court on appeal as Case No.
89-0088.)
The plaintiff, as part of his pre-filing legal research, reasonably relied upon the rulings of Judge
Wilkinson and Judge Sawaya.

C. The Trial Court's Rule 11 Sanction Order Is Clearly
Erroneous Because It Is Completely Unsupported By The"
Record.
Levying sanctions is a two-step process.

Specifically

regarding Rule 11 sanctions, first the trial court should
determine that a pleading violates Rule 11.

Such a finding

"typically involves subsidiary findings, such as the current
state of the law or the parties1 and attorneys1 behavior and
motives within the context of the entire litigation, as well

2.
Admissions of attorneys is specifically mentioned in
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4 as within the exclusive rule
making powers of this Court.

12

as a conclusion on the ultimate question whether the pleading violated Rule 11." Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 672
(10th Cir. 1988).
appropriate remedy.

Second, the trial court must fashion the
Id.

Here, not only did the trial court

not set forth any facts to support its finding of a Rule 11
violation, but it could not because there are simply no such
facts.
The trial court declined to make any findings as to
plaintiff's pre-filing investigation (Order of April 23,
1990, Exhibit "P").

Because there are no facts to support a

finding of inadequate pre-filing investigation, the trial
court's determination must be reversed by this Court as
3
clearly erroneous.
The only facts in the record prove that
plaintiff conducted a thorough pre-filing investigation and
that the law is unclear.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS WAS ERRONEOUS.
No clear and unequivocal law holds that a district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this action.
I
3.
Plaintiff/appellantfs "marshalling of the facts" to
show a lack of evidence to support the factual determination
is a reference to the two (2) uncontroverted detailed
affidavits of plaintiff (Exhibits "B" and "C").

13

Nonetheless, the position of the Bar is that the district
court does not have jurisdiction over any claim against the
Bar arising out of the Bar's activities as an arm of the
Supreme Court carrying out its delegated responsibilities.
The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are
set forth in their entirety in Exhibits "R" (Ut. Const. Art.
VIII, §§ 3-5), f,S" (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as amended)), and "T" (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended)).
Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4, the basis of defendants1
motion to dismiss and the court imposed sanctions herein,
deals only with rule making and has not application to
jurisdiction of this Court or the District Court.

It

provides in pertinent part:
The supreme court by rule shall govern
the practice of law, including admission
to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to
practice.
That constitutional provision is not limited to disciplinary
matters but deals with the governance of the practice of law
in all aspects and the operations of the Utah State Bar
4
whose sole function is to govern the practice of law.

4. District courts routinely, at the request of the Bar,
exercise jurisdiction to enjoin the (unauthorized) practice
of law. Utah State Bar vs. Hamilton, Third Judicial
District Court, Civil No. 88-1380. The Bar's mandate to do
so is based upon Ut. Const., Art. VIII, § 4. Given the
Bar's position and the trial court's ruling in this case,
actions to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law are
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of this Court.

14

The Legislature has not construed Article VIII, § 4 to
preclude original jurisdiction over lawyer discipline cases
in courts other than the Supreme Court.

See e.g., Ut. Code

Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended).

Nor have the

district courts abdicated all jurisdiction over the numerous
tasks related to the governance of law.

See Barnard v.

Hutchinson, Case, No. 88-0578, and in R. Owen Neerings v.
Utah State Bar, et al, Case No. 88-3807, discussed above.
The framers of Article VIII, § 4 clearly intended the
section to grant rule making authority -- not original
jurisdiction -- to the Supreme Court to govern the practice
of law.

Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission,

Jan. 1984 [hereinafter "1984 Report11] ; Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Jan. 1982 [hereinafter "1982
Report11].

In both the 1984 Report and the 1982 Report, the

proposed language regarding the Supreme Court's rulemaking
authority over the practice of law was identical to the
language adopted by the Legislature in 1984.
In the explanation of its proposed § 4, the Commission
stated, "The rulemaking authority also includes a specific
responsibility to govern the practice of law, including the
admission to practice and the discipline of attorneys.11
1984 Report, at 27. In 1982, the Commission explained,
"[Art. VIII, § 4] specifically provides for rulemaking by
the Supreme Court including the right to authorize judges
pro tempore, and to govern the practice of law and the
15

conduct and discipline of attorneys.11

1982 Report, at 21.

Neither explanation of Article VIII, § 4 by the drafters
refers to original jurisdiction over litigation involving
the Utah State Bar.
Certainly, "the regulation of the practice of law" in
Utah is within the exclusive rule-making power of the Utah
Supreme Court.

Utah Const., Art. VIII, § 4.

Almost identi-

cal language is found in Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (3) (1953 as
amended).

Those provisions are in the nature of granting

"legislative" and "administrative" power to the Utah Supreme
Court for the purpose of enacting "laws" or rules to govern
the practice of law.

Article VIII, § 4 does not dictate

the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court vis-a-vis the
District Courts of Utah.

The provision evinces the "sepa-

ration of powers" doctrine and does not establish "jurisdiction" of the Court. Article VIII, § 4 is rule making

5.
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (3) (1953 as amended) provides
that "The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law."
6.
In addition to the exclusive power regarding rules to
govern the practice of law (Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4), the
Utah Supreme Court is to "adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used in the courts of the state . . . " Id.
Thus, following the trial court ruling and the Bar's logic,
a district court could not determine that a rule of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court was unconstitutional.
Likewise, a trial court could not entertain, much less rule
upon, a question as to the validity of a rule of evidence.
Such challenges would have to be raised for the first time
on appeal and only in this Court (not the Court of Appeals).

16

authority and does not suggest that the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction in adversary proceedings to hear legal challenges to disciplinary actions. No Utah cases support such
a suggestion.

\

The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is generally
defined by Article VIII, § 3 (Exhibit ,fR,f) -- the only
constitutional provision that addresses the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction.

The framers of Article VIII, § 3 did not

envision ordinary civil litigation originating in the
Supreme Court.

In the 1984 Report, which proposed the exact

language eventually adopted by the Legislature, the framers
declare:
The proposed article outlines the jurisdiction of
the supreme court. The revision gives the court
the original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law in
federal courts. The supreme court is vested with
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters.
Id., at 26.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is more specifically defined by Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as amended)
(Exhibit

ff lf

S ).

Neither provision vests any jurisdiction

(original, exclusive or otherwise) in the Supreme Court over
the mis-conduct of agents of the Utah State Bar, challenges
to unconstitutional policies or practices of the Bar, etc.
Likewise, Art. VIII, § 5 (Exhibit "R"), and Ut. Code
Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended) define the jurisdiction of
the District Courts. Neither provision denies jurisdiction
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to that court of general jurisdiction over matters regarding
the Bar, its policies and agents. As noted by the framers
of Article VIII, § 5, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction must be very carefully limited because matters originating there have no available avenue of appeal.

1984

Report, at 29. Once again, if the Bar's interpretation of
Article VIII, § 4 is affirmed, then not only will all
litigation involving the Bar, along with all state law based
challenges to procedural and evidentiary rules (supra, note
7) originate in the Supreme Court, but also none of the
litigants therein will enjoy a right of appeal.
Significantly, the Legislature acting pursuant to
Article VIII, has vested original jurisdiction over cases
challenging lawyer discipline in the District Courts. Ut.
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c), § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended)
(Exhibits "S" and

ff M

T

respectively).

The Legislature

granted jurisdiction to the Supreme Court only to hear
appeals regarding lawyer discipline.

Ut. Code § 78-2-2

(3)(c) (1953 as amended) (Exhibits "S") . The Legislature's
constitutional interpretation directly conflicts with the
Bar's and the trial court's interpretation of Art. VIII,
§ 4.
The law in Utah is not clear that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction in this matter.
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An Anomaly
The position of the Utah State Bar and the ruling of
the trial court as to the jurisdiction of the District Court
vis-a-vis the Bar, if true, would create a grand anomaly in
our system of adversary jurisprudence.

Because the Supreme

Court has the exclusive power to make the rules regarding
the practice of law in Utah (Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4),
because the Supreme Court essentially empowered the Bar to
act as the Court's agent (Rules for Integration & Management
of the Utah State Bar), because the Supreme Court approves
all rules enacted by the Utah State Bar, (Id.), and because
the Utah State Bar and its agents are completely subservient
to the Utah Supreme Court, if exclusive jurisdiction over
Bar activities lays only in the Supreme Court, then in
adversary actions, this Court must sit in judgment of claims
of mis-conduct against Bar employees or challenges to Bar
rules or practices.

Such legislative, administrative and

judicial functions should not be combined in one omnipotent
body from which there would be no appeal!

Such a despotic

governance is not appropriate -- not even for attorneys.
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POINT III
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE ACTUALLY
IN THE RECORD AND BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
PROVES THAT PLAINTIFF PERFORMED EXTENSIVE
PRE-FILING RESEARCH IN AN UNSETTLED
AREA OF THE LAW.
Jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and is not
determined as a factual issue.

Nonetheless, the plaintiff

submitted affidavits from eight (8) Salt Lake City attorneys
setting forth the results of research regarding jurisdiction
of a district court in a case such as this.

Those affida-

vits were submitted not to establish the law. However,
those affidavits show that the law is, at least, unclear as
to the jurisdiction of a district court in a case such as
this.

Obviously, there is honest difference of opinion as

to which court has original jurisdiction over cases against
the Utah State Bar.

Plaintiff's choice, not inconsistent

with the opinions of eight experienced area attorneys,
cannot be described as an abuse of the legal process.
A. The Evidence Properly Before The Trial Court
Demonstrates That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By
Levying Rule 11 Sanctions.
Plaintiff's two (2) affidavits set out the facts
underlying his complaint and his legal research in preparation of this case.

(Exhibits "B" & "C").

Those affidavits

recite that he could find no law that prohibited the filing
in district court, and establish more than a reasonable
investigation as to the applicable law prior to the filing.
Eight (8) other attorneys also researched the issue and
20

concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case (Exhibits

ff ff fl

D - K").

Those

uncontroverted affidavits establish that the law in this
case is not clear.

Id.

Plaintiff submitted that evidence twice -- once in
support of an objection to the imposition of sanctions and
fees, and the second time in support of a motion for a new
trial.

Judge Hanson struck that evidence the first time

submitted, (Order of March 14, 1990, Exhibit "M" attached)
but, the Court considered all of that evidence the second
time submitted when considering plaintiff's Motion for a New
Trial.
On March 22, 1990 plaintiff moved for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Rule 59 and Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v.
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, 767 P.2d 125, 99 Ut. Adv. Rep.
25 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).

In support of that motion, the

plaintiff re-submitted the pertinent pleadings.

All of

those pleadings were before the court when Judge Hanson
considered plaintiff's motion for new trial.
In considering plaintiff's motion for a new trial,
ignoring the uncontroverted evidence, the trial court abused
its discretion.
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B. Defendants' Evidence Does Not Even Suggest That
Plaintiff Flagrantly Abused Legal Process.
Defendants cite only two (2) items in support of
plaintiff's alleged lack of reasonable inquiry into the law.
Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Reversal
Motion, p. 10, June 12, 1990.
First, defendants note that plaintiff filed his suit
five (5) hours after the phone call in which co-defendant
Sutliff refused to provide the information that was the
subject of plaintiff's action.

Obviously, plaintiff's

extensive research (Second Affidavit, Exhibit "D") was
completed long before the fateful phone call to Ms. Sutliff.
A lack of research is not proven by the five (5) hour delay
in filing the suit.
Second, defendants note that more than two (2) months
after filing this suit, plaintiff stated that the Utah
Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to discipline
7
attorneys. Id., p. 3, 10.
The Petition filed at that time

7. Such a statement does not confer jurisdiction on this
Court or remove it from the District Court. Neither does
such a statement create case law to justify the ruling of
the Court below. The cited statement is:
25. The Petitioner has no other plain, speedy or
adequate relief available other than this Petition
for an extraordinary writ. The Respondents
herein, [Bar Counsel and the assigned Screening
Panel] the Utah State Bar and its Commission have
no power to amend the Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar without approval of this Court,
(footnote continued)
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before this Court was not a duplicate of the complaint filed
in District Court.

Plaintiff's choice to seek an

extraordinary writ from this Court was entirely proper.
footnote 7.

See

Further, plaintiff's decisions of legal

strategy in no way constitute a flagrant abuse of legal
process.
Neither of defendants' two "facts" support the conclusion that plaintiff knew or should have known that the
District Court lacks jurisdiction over policies of the Utah
State Bar and actions of its staff.

The ten (10) affidavits

submitted establish plaintiff's pre-filing research was
reasonable, that the law is (at least) unclear, and that
plaintiff did not violate Rule 11. There is no evidence to
support the imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff.
The trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.

(footnote continued)
The Respondents herein, the Utah State Bar and its
Commission have no power to determine that a Rule
of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State
Bar is defective, unconstitutional or unenforceable. This Court has the exclusive jurisdiction
to discipline attorneys; therefore, this action
could not be filed in District Court.
p. 8, Verified Petition, Utah Supreme Court, Case No.
89-0445, October 13, 1989.
The relief sought in that Petition before this Court included proposed amendments to the Procedures of Discipline; such
relief is exclusively within the rule-making jurisdiction of
this Court.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff made a reasonable inquiry as to the law prior
to filing the action•
The law is not clear that a District Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the Utah State Bar, its
agents, and its governance of the practice of law.
Sanctions under Rule 11 were not warranted by the
applicable law or the facts of this case.

RELIEF
The decision, judgment and order of the trial court
imposing Rule 11 sanctions and assessing attorney fees
should be reversed.
DATED this 20th day of JULY, 1990.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of JULY, 1990, I
caused to be mailed four (4) copies of the above and foregoing pleading BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
ROBERT REES
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Defendants &
Respondents
175 East 4th South
# 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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EXHIBITS
"A"

Complaint of August 2, 1989

"B"

Affidavit of Plaintiff

M

C"

Second Affidavit of Plaintiff

"D"

Affidavit of JAMES AUSENBAUGH

"E"

Affidavit of JOHN B. MAYCOCK

"F"

Affidavit of ROBERT BREEZE

"G"

Affidavit of G. STEPHEN SULLIVAN

"H"

Affidavit of KEVIN ANDERSON

"I"

Affidavit of ROSS ANDERSON

"J"

Affidavit of GARY FERGUSON

"KM

Affidavit of MARK GUSTAVSON

tlT If

L"

Ruling of February 12, 1990 imposing
sanctions

*M"

Ruling of March 14, 1990 overruling
plaintiff's objection to sanctions and
setting fee award

•N"

Final Order of April 23, 1990

»!/->««
0"

Judgment of April 23, 1990

MT>lt

Order of May 2, 1990 Denying New Trial

"Q"

Notice of Appeal of May 3, 1990

"R"

Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 3
§ 4
§ 5

"S"

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as amended)

"T"

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended)

P"

*

*

*

*

*

As of July 19, 1990, the Third District Court Clerk had
not indexed the trial record. Thus, reference to pages of
the trial record is impossible. For convenience, plaintiff
has attached as exhibits the documents relied upon herein.
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-3204
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,

VERIFIED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 9 ^ 0 * 1 ( ^ 1 / 1 0 t\/

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendant.

THE PLAINTIFF, Brian M. Barnard as a cause of action
states as follows:
1.

The plaintiff is an attorney licensed to practice

law in Utah.
2.

The defendant Toni M. Sutliff is the Assistant Bar

Counsel of the Utah State Bar. At all times pertinent to
this action, she was acting as the agent and employee of the
Utah State Bar.
3.

The Utah State Bar is a governmental agency which

has been delegated certain powers to regulate the practice
of law in the state of Utah including administering discipline.

Suit against the Utah State Bar is authorized by
T PLAINTIFF'S
I
EXHIBIT

Utah statutes and by the Rules of Integration and Management
of the Utah State Bar as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court.
4.

As Assistant Bar Counsel, the defendant Sutliff has

commenced a disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff in
the name of and on behalf of the Utah State Bar.

Said

disciplinary action is based upon false allegations by the
former spouse of a client of the plaintiff; the allegations
were made after the former spouse lost in a divorce modification and enforcement proceeding.
5.

In a letter to plaintiff dated July 28f 1989

regarding said disciplinary action, the defendant Sutliff
stated "I have therefore set this matter for review by a
Screening Panel (of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of
the Utah State Bar J, • . ."
6.

On August 2, 1989 at approximately 10:15 a.m., the

plaintiff in a telephone conversation with the defendant
Sutliff asked for the names of the members of the Screening
Panel to which the matter had been referred.

The defendant

Sutliff stated that the matter had not yet been referred to
a Screening Panel, but would be later referred to such a
Panel.
7.

Plaintiff stated that he would waive any further

preliminary consideration and requested that the matter be
immediately assigned to a Screen Panel and that he be
informed as soon as the matter was assigned as to the names
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of the members of the Panel.

Defendant Sutliff stated that

she would not do so.
8.

Defendant Sutliff stated that the policy of the

Utah State Bar is not to reveal the names of the Screening
Panel members until the attorney actually appears for the
hearing before that Panel.

Defendant Sutliff stated that

she would not provide the plaintiff with the names of the
members of the Screening Panel prior to the actual hearing
to consider the matter.
9.

The plaintiff is entitled to know in advance the

composition of the Screening Panel that will hear the
matter.

Plaintiff is entitled within the bounds of the

Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar and the Rules
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar to have access
to said members.
10.

The refusal of the defendants to provide the

plaintiff with said information and to allow him access to
said panel members constitutes a denial of due process.
11.

The plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that

unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, the defendants
will continue to refuse to identify the membership of said
Screening Panel.
12.

The plaintiff is entitled to and seeks a prelimi-

nary and permanent injunction against the defendants and
each of them (and all officers, agents and employees of the

3

Utah State Bar) from proceeding forward on the above
described disciplinary action until such time as they reveal
to the plaintiff the names of the members of the Screening
Panel that will review the matter.
13.

The Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar

make no provision for procedures as to assignment of pending
disciplinary matters to Screening Panels of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar,

The plaintiff

believes and therefore alleges that the defendants, rather
than randomly assigning and referring matters to Screening
Panelsf select and assign disciplinary matters to specific
panels to their benefit, based upon the composition of said
Panels and to the possible prejudice of the responding
attorney and thereby engage in improper "forum shopping/1
denying due process to the respondent attorney and/or the
plaintiff and denying to the responding attorney and/or the
plaintiff a fair, non-prejudiced and impartial hearing
panel.

WHEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF demands a preliminary and
permanent injunction against the defendants and each of them
(and all officers, agents and employees of the Utah State
Bar) from proceeding forward on the above described
disciplinary action until such time as they reveal to the
plaintiff the names of the members of the Screening Panel
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that will review the matter.

Plaintiff also seeks a

preliminary and permanent injunction against the defendants
from assigning this disciplinary matter to any Screening
Panel except by random selection.

Plaintiff also seeks the

costs of this action and such other and further relief as
the Court deems just and proper in the premises.
DATED this 2nd day of AUGUST, 1989.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

bkiAN y : BAfetfAto

7*

Attorney for Plaintiff

VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF UTAH

SS,
SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE ABOVE NAMED PARTY, BRIAN M. BARNARD personally
appeared before me, a notary public, on the date above
written, and having been duly sworn upon oath acknowledged
to me that he was the person that had executed the above and
foregoing document, having read and understood it, and
knowing the contents thereof to be true and correct, and
swearing to the truth thereof, and having voluntarily
subscribed his name thereto intending to be bound thereby.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111 - 3204
Telephone: ^801) 328-9531 or 328-0532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 89-0904670
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

:
SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been dxily sworn upon oath
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in this action.

2.

On August 2, 1989 at 10:15 a.m., I had a telephone

conversation with the defendant Toni Marie Sutliff, Assistant Bar Counsel regarding a disciplinary matter pending
against me.
3.

I spoke to her because I was informed that

Christine Burdick was not available.

(I believe I was told

that Ms. Burdick was on vacation at that time.)

When I

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT M
5
«

spoke to Ms, Sutliff, she told me that she (and not Ms.
Burdick) was handling that particular disciplinary matter.
4.

In that phone conversation, I ask the names of the

members of the Disciplinary Screening Panel to which the
matter had been assigned.

She told me the matter had not

yet been assigned to such a panel.

(A letter dated July 28f

1989 had lead me to believe that the matter had already been
assigned to a panel.)
5.

Verified Complaint, 11 7 - 8.

In that phone conversation, I then ask Ms, Sutliff

ift once the matter was assigned to a Screening Panelf she
would provide me with the names of the members of the
assigned Disciplinary Screening Panel.

She refused.

Verified Complaint, 11 7 - 8.
6.

In response, Ms. Sutliff specifically said that she

would NOT inform me of the composition of the Screening
Panel even after the matter was assigned to a panel.

She

stated that it was the policy of the Office of Bar Counsel
not to inform the complained of attorney the make-up of the
panel prior to the hearing.
7.

Verified Complaint, 11 7 - 8.

At her deposition taken in this case on September

8, 1989, defendant Toni Sutliff again confirmed under oath
that on August 2, 1989, she told me she would not give me
the names of the Screening Panel members even after the case
was assigned to a screening panel.
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8.

I needed the names of the members of the Screening

Panel for two (2) reasons -- to determine if a motion for
recusal was appropriate, and to commence legal action
against the panel members.

Therefore, I filed this action

on August 2, 1989 seeking the names of the panel members.
9.

After filing this suit, Ms. Burdick informed me by

letter of September 6, 1989 of the names of the Panel
members to which my disciplinary matter was then assigned.
Ms. Burdick1s letter of September 6, specifically refers to
my conversation with Ms. Sutliff of August 2nd, which was
the basis of this suit.
10.

After Ms. Burdick countermanded Ms. Sutliffs

position iind provided me the names of the panel members, I
voluntarily dismissed this action on September 11, 1989.
11.

After provided with the names of the panel mem-

bers, I suggested that a conflict of interest existed with
the Chair of the Screening Panel.

In response, the matter

was re-assigned to another screening panel.
12.

On October 13, 1989, I filed a Petition for

Extraordinary Writ in the Utah Supreme Court regarding the
pending disciplinary action against me, Case No. 89-0445.
Exhibit "B" to Defendants* Memorandum.

That action chal-

lenged on due process grounds certain of the Procedures of
Discipline of the Utah State Bar.

In that action I named as

respondents the individual members of the panel before whom
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the disciplinary matter was then pending.

That Supreme

Court action was successful and the Procedures of Discipline
of the Utah State Bar have been substantially changed as a
result.
13.

(a)

I filed this action in good faith and based

upon the clear and direct refusal of Toni Marie Sutliff to
reveal to me that names of the Screening Panel members even
after the matter was assigned to a panel.
(b)

I believed upon filing this action and

believe now that I am entitled to know the names of the
members of an assigned Screening Panel sufficiently in
advance of the hearing to seek recusal and/or if
appropriate, commence legal action against them.
14.

I filed this action to protect my interests and

rights in a disciplinary action pending before the Utah
State Bar.

I did not file this action for any improper

motive or purpose.

At the time I filed this action, I

honestly believed that this action was proper.
to so believe.

I continue

But for the filing of this actionf I believe

that the Office of Bar Counsel and Ms. Sutliff would not
have provided me with the names of the Screening Panel
members.
15.

My only possible error in this action was filing

it in this Court rather than as an original petition before
the Utah Supreme Court.

I sought to enlist the aid of the
4

broad equitable powers of this court.

Such a defect (if

that it be) is not a violation of Rule 11 or Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (1953 as amended).

The relief sought in this

action would clearly be available from the Utah Supreme
Courtf and merely filing an action in the wrong court is not
cause for sanctions.
16.

By way of an explanation as to filing in this

Court, I present the following:

prior to this suit, I filed

two (2) other actions against the Utah State Bar in this
Court:

Case No. 88-0578, Judge Homer Wilkinson and Case No.

88-0801, Judge Pat Brian.

Each of those actions involved

aspects of the practice of law, the licensing of lawyers in
Utah, or functioning of the Utah State Bar, all issues which
appear at first blush to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court.

Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4.

In each of those actions, the defendants moved to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction and in each case those motions were
not granted.
17.

After dismissal of this action, I sought through a

rule making petition amendments to the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar ordering the Office of Bar
Counsel to inform accused attorneys as to the names of
members of Screening Panels immediately upon assignment to
the panel, and to change the procedures for assignment of
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matters to disciplinary panels.

Utah Supreme Court, Case

No. 89-0423
18.

1 have repeatedly attempted to resolve disputes

with the Utah State Bar Commissioners short of litigation.
They and their legal counsel refuse to discuss possible
non-litigation resolution.

Avenues "more reasonable and

less adversarial and less costly11 than litigation are not
available to me, largely because of the attitude and conduct
of the Commission and its staff.
19.

As recently as November 1, 1989 I informed Steven

Hutchinson that I thought having to defend suits brought
against the Utah State liar was M a poor way to spend funds
and resources of
spend Bar tnonty.

the Utah State Bar" and a foolish way to
I have repeatedly suggested, to no avail,

that the use of simple openness would resolve many of the
disputes that I have with the Bar.

In that letter of

November 1st I was requesting that the Bar provide me with
information as to its 1989 lobbying activities.

The Bar is

now required to provide me the precise type of information
that I requested.

The Bar is so required, not because of

cooperation, but because of litigation and a petition to the
Utah Supreme Court.
20.

I have no desire

tf

to interfere with the orderly

functioning of the [Utah State] Bar."

I simply seek to

encourage the Utah State Bar, its Commission and staff to
6

function fairly, openly and honestly within the bounds of
the law and the Constitution and within the mandate from the
Utah Supreme Court.
21.

As an active and dues paying mandatory member of

the Utah State Bar, I shall continue to express my opinions
and make suggestions regarding the operations and actions of
the staff and Commission of the Utah State Bar,

1st Amend,.,

U.S. Const.
22.

I am an active member of the Utah State Barf

having chaired the annual "Sub-for-Santa" project and the
Annual Blood Drive of the Young Lawyer Section, for more
than eleven (11+) years. The Bar recently published (November 1989) an article in the Utah Bar Journal that I
co-authored regarding the ethical duty of attorneys to
represent indigent prison inmates in civil rights actions.
I am chair of a Utah State Bar Young Lawyer Section project
to create an endowment to fund an annual award as a part of
a Salt Lake County-wide high school blood drive program.
Two years ago, I donated one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) to
a special committee of the Utah State Bar (upon which I
served) to help commemorate the Bicentennial of the signing
of the United States Constitution.
23.

The list of my litigation against the Utah State

Bar appended to Steven Hutchinson's Affidavit is incomplete.
My litigation began in 1976 or 1977 when I successfully
7

challenged the Bar's total ban on advertising by lawyers.
Since then I have successfully litigated other aspects of
lawyer advertising against the Utah State Bar.

I also

successfully sued the Utah State Bar for violation of the
First Amendment for unlawful censorship relative to its
former publication, the UTAH BAR LETTER.

Several of those

lawsuits have resulted in the Utah State Bar having to pay
substantial attorney fees to me.

DATED thir, 16th day of JANUARY, 1990.

-,

Y

,

x-

• BRIAN M. BA1
iARNARD
Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN,

:Mc...

My comm. expires:
Notary Public

.. !

•70200.400
Sa&UfcoCH* Utah 84111.
KVCofnmMM Expires I

//l((/r-/h.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of JANUARY, 1990,
I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
pleading AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF to:
ROBERT REES
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 4th South # 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff »
"
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111 - 3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 89-0904670
SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

STATE OF UTAH

SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been duly sworn upon oath
deposes and states on personal knowledge as follows:

1.

I am the plaintiff in this action.

I am an attor-

ney admitted to practice before this Court and the Courts of
the State of Utah.
2.

I have practiced law since 1969.

Prior to filing this lawsuit I researched the law

applicable to this action and specifically the jurisdiction
of this court to hear matters regarding the operations of
the Utah State Bar.
(a)

In doing so, I reviewed all of the Rules for

(0

Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar, the Rules z i

of Professional Conduct and the Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar to determine if there was any law, rule,
statute or regulation which required actions challenging
actions by the Utah State Bar be brought only in the Utah
Supreme Court.
(b)

I found none.

I read Ut. Code Ann. S§ 78-2-1 et seq (1953 as

amended) and Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 3, dealing with jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court.
(c) Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended)
provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme
Court regarding matters of lawyer discipline.

There is no

provision in that statute for original or exclusive jurisdiction before the Supreme Court regarding matters of lawyer
discipline.
(d) Art. VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution provides
that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and appellate jurisdiction
over other matters as provided by statute.

There is no

provision in that constitutional article for original or
exclusive jurisdiction before the Supreme Court regarding
matters of lawyer discipline.

That provision provides for

concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts for the
issuance of extraordinary writs.
(e)

I read Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (3) (1953 as amend-

ed) which provides that by rule by Utah Supreme Court shall
2

govern the practice of law, including admissions and discipline.

There is no provision in that statute for original

or exclusive jurisdiction before the Supreme Court regarding
matters of discipline,
(f)

I read Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4 which provides

that by rule by Utah Supreme Court shall govern the practice
of law, including admissions and discipline.

That provision

deals only with the rule making powers of the Supreme Courtf
That provision does not deal with jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

There is nothing in that provision which

would prevent the bringing of this action in this Court.
(g)

I read Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-3-1 et seq (1953 as

amended) and Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 5, dealing with jurisdiction of the Utah District Courts and other courts*

I

found nothing in those provisions that prohibited the
bringing of this action in this Court.
noted

Specifically, I

,f

The district court has original jurisdiction in all

matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law."
(1953 as amended).

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1)

Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 5 has a similar

broad jurisdictional statement.

I looked for any specific

provision in the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes to
prohibit the bringing of this action in the District Court
and found that there was none.

3

(h)

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended) and Ut.

Const. Art. VIII, § 5 provide that the District Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to issue
extraordinary writs.

This case sought only an injunction

and declaratory relief„
3.

Prior to filing this lawsuit I researched and I

reviewed the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court to determine if there was any rule or
regulation which required actions seeking injunctive relief
against and/or challenging action by the Utah State Bar be
brought only in the Utah Supreme Court.

I found there was

no such provision.
4.

Prior to filing this lawsuit I researched and I

reviewed the Pacific Digest to determine if there was any
Utah case law which established that actions challenging
action by the Utah State Bar or its agents be brought only
in the Utah Supreme Court.

I found no such reported case

law.
5.

Prior to filing this lawsuit, I researched and

reviewed all of the reported cases of the Utah Supreme Court
dealing with lawyer discipline since 1970 to determine if
there was any reported Utah case law which established that
actions challenging actions by the Utah State Bar be brought
only in the Utah Supreme Court.
case law.

4

There is no such reported

6.

Prior to filing this suit, I had personally filed

two (2) other actions against the Utah State Bar in this
Court:
(a)

Case No. 88-0578, assigned to Judge Homer

Wilkinson, and
(b)

Case No. 88-0801, assigned to Judge Pat Brian.

Each of those actions involved aspects of the practice
of law, the licensing of lawyers in Utah, or functioning of
the Utah State Bar.

In each of those actions, the defendant]

officers of the Bar sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

In Case No. 88-0578 Judge Wilkinson specifically

denied the request to dismiss made by defendants therein.
In Case No. 88-0801, Judge Brian has yet to rule on the
jurisdictional issue.
7.

Plaintiff also represented a party in R. Owen

Neerings v. Utah State Bar, et al, Case No. 88-3807 (Judge
J. Sawaya, filed June, 1988) dealing with the operations of
the Utah State Bar related to the bar exam and the privacy
of results of the bar exam.

Judge Sawaya found that this

Court had jurisdiction, and in early 1989, resolved the case
on its merits.
8.

The defendants have yet to cite any case law or

other legal authority from the State of Utah that required
the filing of this action before the Utah Supreme Court
rather than in this court.

Defendants1 Reply Memo Re:

5

Sanctions, p. 3; Defendants' Memo Seeking Sanctions, p. 8;
Defendants' Memo Re:
9.

Motion to Dismiss, pp. 2 - 5.

The only Utah authority that defendants have cited

to support their claim of lack of jurisdiction is Ut. Const.
VIII, § 4, dealing with rule making powers of the Court and
not dealing with jurisdiction, which provides in pertinent
part:
The supreme court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted
to practice.
10.

Pursuant to that provision. Art. VIII, § 4 , 1

understand that the Utah Supreme Court has the exclusive
power to create and modify rules regarding the discipline of
attorneys.
powers.

That provision concerns only its rule making

That section provides for the separation of powers

and provides that the executive and legislative branches of
government shall not be involved in the governance of the
practice of law, an exclusive function of the judiciary.
Art. VIII, § 4 does not suggest that the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction in adversary proceedings to hear legal challenges to disciplinary proceedings.
that support such a suggestion.

I have found no cases

Art. VIII, § 4 and encom-

passes the governance of all aspects of the practice of law
not solely lawyer discipline.

6

11.

After my research as set forth above, I was able

to find no preclusion to bringing a suit in equity in this
Court to enjoin or to challenge procedures in that disciplinary process.
12.

(a)

In adversary case, Barnard v. Sutliff, et al,

Case No. 89-0445 filed in the Utah Supreme Court a month
after this case was dismissed, (Exhibit "B11 to Defendants*
Memo Re:

Sanctions), I sought substantial modifications of

the Procedures of Discipline because of due process defects
therein.

That relief was not sought in this action.

I did

not request that this Court in this action alter or amend
the Procedures of Discipline (which only the Utah Supreme
Court can do.)

In that adversary proceeding, using its rule

making powers, the Utah Supreme Court did alter the Procedures of Discipline.
(b)

Minute Entry, Exhibit

,f H

M

attached.

My references in that adversary Petition

(Id., 1 2, p. 2; 1 25, p. 8) to the exclusive power of the
Supreme Court were meant to refer to its power to adopt and
change the disciplinary rules and the procedures of lawyer
discipline, the relief sought in that Petition.
13.

To the best of ray knowledge, information and

belief formed after a reasonable inquiry as described above,
I believed that the filing of this action in this court was
warranted by existing law, or by a good faith argument for

7

the clarification, extension, or modification of existing
law.
14.

Based upon my experience and knowledge of this

case, the fees claimed by defendants1 counsel are excessive.
The preparation and filing of the motion to dismiss and the
motion for sanctions herein along with their supporting
memorandums, and the resolution of this case, should not
have required the expenditure of almost five thousand
dollars ($5,000.00) in fees and costs by attorneys with the
knowledge, training and experience of Carmen Kipp and Robert
Rees.

The costs and expenses claimed by the defendants1

counsel, under the common practice of attorneys in the Salt
Lake City area, should be absorbed in overhead expenses
reflected by the hourly rates of counsel and not charged in
addition to those hourly fees.
DATED this 26th day of FEBRUARY, 1990.
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BRIAN M.f
BARNARD
Plaintiff / Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN
BY BRIAN M. BARNARD.
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111 - 320A
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 89-0904670

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
JAMES AUSENBAUGH

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

STATE OF UTAH

SS,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
JAMES AUSENBAUGH having been duly sworn upon oath
deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am an attorney admitted to practice before the

Supreme Court of Utah and this Court.
2.

At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched

the legal question as to whether an action for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its
counsel regarding the procedures and their conduct in an

zjol
<m

attorney disciplinary matter could be brought in a District
Court in Utah.
3.

I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah

that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in such a
case.
4.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended)

provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme
Court as to matters of lawyer discipline.
5.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives

the District Court "original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not
prohibited by law."
6.

I am aware of Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4 granting

the Utah Supreme Court the power to, by rule, regulate the
practice of law.

In my opinion that provision does not

preclude a District Court from exercising equitable powers
to prevent mis-conduct of bar counsel and/or to challenge
procedures in attorney disciplinary actions.
no law that contradicts that opinion.
DATED this ^ Z ^ day of FEBRUARY, 1990.

JAMB^JUJSENBAUGH
Affiant
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I have found

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN
BY JAMES AUSENBAUGH.
My comm. expires:

^//^t^/yJ

(7. /fr/m***—

/Ada JStt /??#
St.my ' '

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 89-0904670
Barnard v. Sutliff
Affidavit of James Ausenbaugh

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the^&g, day of FEBRUARY,
1990, I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing pleading AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES AUSENBAUGH to:
ROBERT REES
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 4th South # 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for PlaintiJ
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 02
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111 - 3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 89-0904670
AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN B. MAYCOCK

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

STATE OF UTAH

SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
JOHN B. MAYCOCK having been duly sworn upon oath
deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am an attorney admitted to practice before the

Supreme Court of Utah and this Court.

I have practiced law

in Utah for fifteen (15) years, concentrating primarily in
civil litigation.
2.

At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched

whether a Utah District Court has jurisdiction over an
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
V

~*t «u0«ivea.

... ««4^«ttr.i

action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the
Utah State Bar and its counsel regarding procedures followed
and bar counsel's conduct in an attorney disciplinary
matter.
3.

I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah

that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in such a
case.
4.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(c) (1953 as amended)

provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme
Court as to matters of lawyer discipline.
5.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives

the District Court "original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not
prohibited by law."
6.

I am aware of the provisions of Utah Constitution,

Art. VIII, § § 3 and 5 concerning original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the District Courts and
other state courts.

I am also aware of Utah Constitution

Art. VIII, § 4 requiring the Utah Supreme Court to govern,
by rule, the practice of law including the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law,
7.

In my opinion, the argument that the District

Court, and not the Supreme Court, has original jurisdiction
over this action is warranted by the existing law cited

o

above, or by a good faith argument for the extension of such
existing law.
DATED this 26th day of FEBRUARY, 1990.

B. MAYCOCK
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN
BY JOHN B. MAYCOCK.
My comm. expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 89-0904670
Barnard v. Sut11ff
Affidavit of John B. Maycock
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
84111 - 3204
Salt Lake Citv, UTAH
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 89-0904670
AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT BREEZF

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

STATE OF UTAH

SS,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
ROBERT BREEZE having been duly sworn upon oath deposes
and states as follows:

1.

I an an attorney admitted to practice before the

Supreme Court of Utah and this Court.
2.

At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched

the legal question as to whether an action for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its
counsel regarding the procedures and their conduct in ap.
PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
F

attorney disciplinary matter could be brought in a District
Court in Utah.
3.

I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah

that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in ruch a
case.
4.

Ut. Code A m . ? 78-2-7 (3)(c) (1953 as amended)

provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme
Court as to matters of lawyer discipline.
5.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives

the District Court "original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not
prohibited by law."
6.

. • ,

I am aware of Utah Const, Art. VIII, § 4 granting

the Utah Supreme Court the power to, by rule, regulate the
practice of law.

In my opinion that provision does not

preclude a District Court from exercising equitable powers
to prevent mis-conduct of bar counsel and/or to challenge
procedures in attorney disciplinary actions.

I have found

no law that contradicts that opinion.
DATED this

^ - 3 day of FEBRUARY, 1990.

ROBERT BREEZE
Affiant

*»

^^^.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN
BY ROBERT BREEZE.

Ck/?-tf//tt f/4T

My coram, expires:

/

S£}TARY PUBLIC
/ R e s i d i n g ^t-_ S a l t Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 89-0904670
Barnard v. Sutliff
Affidavit of Robert Breeze

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ " d a y of FEBRUARY,
1990,

I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and forego-

ing pleading AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT BREEZE to:
ROBERT REES
KIPP k CHRISTIAN
175 East 4th South # 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Jilaintiff.
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BRIAN M BARNARD - USB#0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN M. BARNARD,

AFFIDAVIT OF G.
i STEVEN SULLIVAN

Plaintiff,
vs.

i Civil No. 89-0904670

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,

i Judge T.R. Hanson

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
G„

ss

STEVEN SULLIVAN

having

been duly sworn upon oath

deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am an attorney admitted to practice before the

Supreme Court of Utah and this Court.
2.

At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched

the legal question as to whether an action
declaratory
regarding

relief
the

against

procedures

for injunctive and

the Utah State Bar and its counsel
and

their

conduct

in

an

attorney

disciplinary matter could be brought in a District Court in Utah.

0*

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
G

i

3.

I have found no statute, rule or case lav/ in Utah

that would deny the District Court jurisdiction in such a case.
4.

Ut. Code Ann. §78-2-2

(3){c)

(1953 as amended)

provides only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme Court
as to matters of lawyer discipline.
5.

Ut. Code Ann. §79-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives

the District Court

"original

jurisdiction in all matters civil

and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited
by law.6.
the

Utah

I am aware of Utah Const. Art. VIII# §4 granting

Supreme

practice of law.

Court

the

power

to, by

rule,

regulate

the

In my opinion that provision does not preclude

a District Court from exercising equitable powers to prevent misconduct of bar counsel and/or to challenge procedures in attorney
disciplinary actions.

I have found no law that contradicts that

opinion.
DATED this

2*{p

day of February, /990,

Zl

G. ^TEVEN SUL
Affiaitt

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN BY G.
STEVEN SULLIVAN.

NOTARY PUBLIC
SHIRLEY J. 8ROWM
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Case No. 89-0904670
Barnard v. Sutliff
Affidavit of G. Steven Sullivan
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of February,

1990, I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
pleading AFFIDAVIT OF G. STEVEN SULLIVAN to:
ROBERT REES
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 4th South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff

RIAN M. BARNARJ^"
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake Citv, UTAH
84111 - 3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 89-0904670
AFFIDAVIT OF
KEVIN N. ANDERSON

TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

KEVIN N. ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and f of
his own personal knowledge, states:

1.

I obtained my juris doctorem from Georgetown

University Law Center in 1981, and was admitted to practice
before the Supreme Court of Utah and this Court in 1981.
2.

At the request of Brian M. Barnard, I researched

the legal question as to whether an action for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and

PLAINTIFF
EXHIBIT
H
A l l SI ATt LEGAL S L * M v

its counsel regarding their conduct in an attorney disciplinary
matter could be brought in a District Court in Utah.
3.

I have found no constitutional provision, statute,

rule or case law in Utah which would deny the District Court
jurisdiction in such a case,

Utah Const, art. VIII, S 5 and Utah

Code Ann. S 78-3-4 give the District Court original jurisdiction
in all matters civil and criminal, except as limited by the Constitution or by statute.
4.

Utah Code Ann, S 78-2-2(3)(c) provides only for

appellant jurisdiction before the Supreme Court as to matters of
lawyer discipline.

That section also specifically denotes those

situations where original jurisdiction is in the Supreme Court.
Disciplinary actions are not listed as being in the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction.
5.

I am aware of Utah Const, art. VIII# $ 4 granting

the Utah Supreme Court the power to regulate the practice of law.
In my opinion, invoking the jurisdiction of a District Court to
exercise its equitable powers to prevent misconduct of bar counsel and/or to challenge whether bar counsel properly followed the
procedures established by the Supreme Court in attorney disciplinary actions is warranted by existing law or, in good faith,
an argument for the extension of existing law.
law that contradicts that opinion.
-2-

I have found no

DATED this «>LV3

day of February, 1990.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^ £ ?
February, 1990.

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC I, . U I

Residing At; jSOltU^
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My Commission Expires:

llXtUfCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of February,

1990, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the foregoing Affidavit of Kevin N. Anderson to the following:
Robert H. Rees, Esq.
Kipp & Christian
175 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
214 E a s t F i f t h S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84111
Phone:
(801) 3 2 8 - 9 5 3 2
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUftT^N AND FOR ' "- .'./ *<?
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTtfJfcL
BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

County of Salt Lake

S.v'

CIVIL NO. 89-0904670
AFFIDAVIT OF
ROSS C. ANDERSON

TONI M. SUTL1FF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

X^

Hon. T.R. Hanson
)
) ss:
)

ROSS C. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am an attorney admitted to practice before the United States

District Court for the District of Utah, the Supreme Court of Utah and this Court
and have been actively engaged in the private practice of law, primarily in the
area o( civil litigation, for more than 11 years.
2.

Brian M. Barnard has advised me that Rule 11 sanctions are being

sought against him in the above-captioned matter because he commenced an
action in the Third Judicial District Court, rather than the Utah Supreme Court,
for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its counsel
regarding an attorney disciplinary matter*
3.

From my review of the applicable constitutional and statutory

provisions, it appears to me that if there are Rule 11 sanctions to be imposed,
they should be assessed against the person or entity urging that Mr. Barnard should
be penalized for filing the action in District Court.

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
AiiSTATc ICGAI sum. Y c a

4.

If I were going to file an action against the Utah State Bar

relating to due process violations in disciplinary matters, I would commence the
action in District Court for the following reasons:
a.

Article VIII, S 5 of the Utah Constitution provides that H[t]he

District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute . . ."
b.

I have found no constitutional provision or statute depriving

the District Court of jurisdiction in an action seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief with respect to attorney discipline matters.

The only constitutional

provision even remotely related to the issue is Article VIJI, § 4, which simply
provides that lf[t]he supreme court by rule shall govern the practice of law,
including • . . the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law"
[emphasis added]; that constitutional provision does not vest the Utah Supreme
Court with exclusive or original jurisdiction in attorney discipline matters.
Inasmuch as Mr. Barnard was not seeking governance by rule nor challenging the
rules promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court, but, rather, was seeking equitable
relief under existing law, Article VIII, § 4 is not relevant to this case.
c.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(c) provides that the Utah

Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over discipline of lawyers. Nothing in
§ 78-2-2 indicates in any way that the Utah Supreme Court would have original or
exclusive jurisdiction in an action seeking the injunctive and declaratory relief
sought by Mr. Barnard in his Complaint in the above-referenced matter.
d.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4(1) provides that the District Court

"has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the

-2-

Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Inasmuch as there is no relevant
exception in the Utah Constitution and the exercise of original jurisdiction by the
District Court in this matter is not prohibited by law, it clearly appears that the
District Court, not the Utah Supreme Court, is the proper court for the
commencement of this case.
5.

Based upon the well-known antagonism between Mr. Barnard and

the officials of the Utah State Bar, of which this Court can probably take judicial
notice, I am extremely concerned that the Utah State Bar and its counsel are
resorting to baseless and untenable arguments merely in an effort to punish Mr.
Barnard for his extensive litigation against the Utah State Bar.
6.

Rule 11 provides, in part, that an attorney's signature on a

pleading constitutes a "certificate by him that he has read the pleading . . . ; that
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose . • . " According to my research and
understanding of the law, Mr. Barnard was justified in invoking the jurisdiction of
the District Court, rather than the Utah Supreme Court, in this action and cannot
be reasonably found to have violated Rule 11 in his determination that this action
should be commenced in District Court.
DATED this«2>today of February, 1990.

Ross C. Anderson
50 West Broadway, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
-3-
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this &?Utl day of February,
1990, by Ross C. Anderson.

My Commission Expires:
12-03-90
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
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Salt Lake City, UTAH
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 89-0904670
AFFIDAVIT OF
GARY B. FERGUSON
(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

THE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT OF GARY B. FERGUSON is submitted
by the plaintiff herein.

DATED this 26th day of FEBRUARY, 1990.

BRIAN M.^BARNARD
Attorney for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
Att-STAff tCCAl SUM*Y CO.

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Gary B. Ferguson, under oath, upon personal
knowledge, states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney admitted to practice before

the Supreme Court of Utah and a member in good standing of the
Utah State Bar.
2.

At the request of Brian M. Barnard, Z

researched the question as to whether an action for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Utah State Bar and its
counsel regarding the procedures and their conduct in an
attorney disciplinary matter could be brought in the district
court in Utah.
3.

I have found no statute, rule or case law in

Utah that would deny the district court jurisdiction in such a
case.
4.

Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah

Constitution provides that:

f,

The district court shall have

original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs.11
5.

Section 78-3-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953

as amended), gives the district court "original jurisdiction in

all matters civil and criminal, not accepted in the
Constitution and not prohibited by law."
6.

Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah

Constitution provides that: "The Supreme Court by rule shall
govern the practice of law including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law.11

[Emphasis added].
7.

Section 78-2-2# Utah Code Annotated (1953, as

amended) provides that:
(2) The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs
and process necessary to carry into
effect its orders, judgments, and
decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
. . . .

(c) Discipline of lawyers; [Emphasis
added].
8.

In my opinion, the jurisdiction of the

district court, as outlined in Article VIII, Section 4 and
§78-3-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) includes
jurisdiction to prevent misconduct of bar counsel, or other
challenges to the procedures in the attorney disciplinary
actions.

If the Supreme Court were to determine that my

opinion is incorrect, that determination would be one of first
impression in the State of Utah.
9*

It is my opinion that the power given to the

Supreme Court by the State of Utah by Article VIII, Section 4

2

to the effect that: "The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the
practice of law, including admissions to practice law and the
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law" is
a quasi legislative and quasi executive function.

This

provision does not # in my opinion, give to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah sole judicial authority to review equal
protection o r due process complaints regarding disciplinary
procedures followed by the Utah State Bar.

If in fact the

Utah Supreme Court concludes that it has this power solely unto
itself, then this would be an extension, clarification or
modification of existing law not known to any practitioner in
the State of Utah prior to the Court f s issuing such a ruling.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT:

DATED this06rLl day of

STATE OF UTAH

fegZUA^\

.

1990 .

)

. ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On this %(A day of 2 ^
., 1990,
personally appeared before me Gary B. Fergi#on, who being first
duly sworn# states that h e h a s read the foregoing instrument,
knows the contents contained therein are true and correct, and
signs the same as his own free act.
My Commission Expires:
BERNARD/GBF
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IK THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FCP
SALT LAKF COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
•
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EPIAN r . PARNAPD.

Plaintiff,

:
:

VS.

Civil No. 8S-09C467C
AFFIDAVIT OF
MARK S.

TCMI r. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,

CUST/VSCf!

:
(Hon.

Defendants.

T.F.

Hanson)

:

STATF CF UTAH
CCUf'TY OF SALT LAKE

ss,

f7PK S. CUST£VSCH, having been duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and states as follews:
1.

I arr an attorney admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of

Utah and this Court, USB No. 127F.
2.

Ft the request of Prian f\ Parnard, Esq., I have researched the

legal question regarding whether an action for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the Utah State Bar and its counsel, regarding the officially-adopted procedures and conduct of the Utah State Bar in an attorneydisciplinary matter, could be brought originally in a District Court in
fmmam
Utah. I understand that Mr. Barnard's challenge to the Bar was not focused
on the individual, autonomous activity of Vs. Sutlifff but rather sought

1
3
>

1(0
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relief against the decisions, procedures and policies of the Utah State Bar
that have been carried out by Vs. Sutliff.
3.

I have found no statute, rule or case law in Utah that would deny

the District Court original jurisdiction in a case where an attorney is
challenging the standards and procedures of the Utah State Par.

This issue

is distinct from an attorney-disciplinary matter where only the conduct of
an individual attorney, when measured against the Code of Professional responsibility

and

other

ethical

constraints,

is

being

determined

and

assessed.
A.

Ut. Code Ann. Section 78-2-2 (3) (c) (1953 as amended) provides

only for appellate jurisdiction before the Supreme Court regarding matters
of lawyer discipline.

Therefore, an action challenging the Bar's rules and

procedures could not be brought originally in the Supreme Court assuming,
^uencto, that the case could not, be brought originally in District Court.
5.

Ut. Code /nn. Section 78-3-4 (1) (1953 as amended) gives the Dis-

trict Court "....original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal,
not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law,"
6.

I am aware cf the provisions Utah Const. Art. VIII, Section 4

which grants the Utah Supreme Court the power, by rule, to regulate the
practice of law.

In my opinion, that provision does not preclude a Dis-

trict Court from exercising original jurisdiction and equitable powers to
prevent the actions of Par Counsel to the extent that such actions by Par
Counsel carry out adopted procedures and rules of the Utah State Bar; such
a circumstance is legally and factually distinct from an allegation of mis-

conduct against another individual attorney who, autonomously# acted in an
unprofessional manner. I have found no law that contradicts that opinion.
7.

While the Utah Supreme has original jurisdiction regarding rules

promulgated to regulate the Utah State Bar, such original jurisdiction is
not exclusive jurisdiction.

For the reason that certain sorts of civil

actions can be brought in both Third Circuit and Third District Courts,
even though both Courts have original jurisdiction, Mr. Barnard's action
could be sensibly brought in Third District Court.
DATED thilis

day of FEBRUARY

MARK S. G
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THE DATE ABOVE WRITTEN BY MARK S. GUSTAVSON.
My commission expires:

*0

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH_
Case No. 89-0904670
Barnard v. Sutliff
Affidavit of Mark Gustavson

V^J^&n.
I ,*lll3^
\uW@£sk<\
IMflEKftVA

NotarvPubfle _
VIRGINIA PeVEPEUJS
43t8 South 4665 West
West \totey. Utah Wt20
My Commas!** Expiree
* March 23.1993
SUteofUtai)

,
I
I
I
I
II

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the^j^fcday of FEBRUARY, 1990, I caused to
be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing pleading AFFIDIAVIT OF MARK S.
GUSTAVSON, ESQ, to:
'; ••"••'•V "IKAV7HJC 13/. ,.•,,-. , . . . . , .
ROBERT REES
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 4th South, #330
•t^i
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DEPUTY Cf)«JB-irn?s-~
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepa id in the United StatVPosta
Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC .
Attorney l o ^ H ^ R T i f f

FILED QKTftiCT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 1 i test)
SALT LAX* COUNTY

By.
Deputy Cler*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

890904670

vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

Before

the

Court

is

the defendants' Motion for Sanctions

and Fees.

The matter is submitted pursuant

the

of

Code

Judicial

moving party and
Points

and

the

plaintiff

necessary.
this

have

Rule

4-501

of

Both the defendant as
submitted

Memoranda

of

Authorities, as well as Affidavits supporting their

respective positions.
argument,

Administration.

to

and

the

There

Court

has

does

been

no

request

for

not deem that oral argument is

The Court has carefully reviewed the entire file

matter,

including

the

pleadings

and

resisting papers with regard to this

Motion,

fully

the

advised,

the

Court

oral

enters

the

moving

Being

following

in
and

therefore
Memorandum

Decision.

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
L
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defendants

in

this

case

MEMORANDUM DECISION

seek

sanctions against the

plaintiff for the filing of this Complaint
the
of

on

the

basis

that

conduct of the plaintiff violated Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
Civil

Complaint

Procedure,

and

further

that

constitutes

a

violation

of

Code Ann., 1953 as amended,

the

filing

of

the

Section 78-27-56, Utah

As sanctions, the

defendants

seek

their attorney's fees incurred in defending this matter.
Dealing

first

plaintiff's

with

Complaint

the

defendants'

violates

Section

claim

78-27-56,

that

the

Utah

Code

Ann., 1953 as amended, in that the Complaint was brought in
faith

and

without

merit,

the Court is satisfied based on the

standards enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in
requests
that

for

the

This

showing

has

not

this

with

Court

been

made

by

the

Court cannot say on the present state of the

pleadings, that the Complaint was brought
can

dealing

attorney's fees under the aforementioned statute,

requisite

defendants.

bad

say,

based

upon

the

in

bad

present

faith.
state

pleadings, that the Complaint was wholly without merit

Nor

of the
when

it

was originally filed.
The Court notes that
question

of

fact

there

between

the

appears

to

defendants

regarding what was said in the conversation on

be

a

and

substantial
the plaintiff

August

2,

1989

BARNARD V. SUTLIFF
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between the defendant Toni M. Sutliff and
M.

Barnard.

Mr.

Barnard

the

plaintiff

suggests that he was advised by Ms.

Sutliff that he would not receive at any time#
screening

panel

was

Brian

designated,

even

after

the

the names of the panel.

The

defendants suggest that had Mr. Barnard waited more than
hours

to

file

his

Complaint

after

the

information

requested.

seek

the

provided

Because of that question of fact,

this Court cannot say that there was no basis
to

few

aforementioned

conversation with Ms. Sutliff, that he would have been
the

a

for

Mr.

Barnard

relief that he originally sought in his Complaint

filed August 2, 1989.
Accordingly,

after

careful

consideration,

this

Court is

unwilling to impose sanctions in the form of attorney's fees
otherwise,

as

requested

by

or

the defendants, on the basis that

the plaintiff has violated Section

78-27-56,

Utah

Code

Ann.,

1953 as amended.
Turning
defendants

to

the

against

claimed
the

violations

plaintiffs

under

asserted

by

Rule 11 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does not believe that
has

there

been a showing of lack of reasonable inquiry into the facts

by the plaintiff before this suit was filed, and on
the

the

Court

that

basis

is unwilling to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the form

of attorney's fees or otherwise.

Also,

the

defendants

allege

BARNARD V. SUTLIFF
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that the Verified
purpose,

such

Complaint

as

was

MEMORANDUM DECISION

interposed

for

an

harassment, and in that regard has submitted

an Affidavit of Mr. Hutchinson, Executive Director of
State

Bar,

setting

a

defendant

herein,

as

Mr.

Barnard

in

the

the

Utah

State

While it

is

clear

may constitute an annoyance to the defendant

Bar, the Court is unable to say,
dispute

Utah

well as a summary of litigation

between Mr. Barnard and the Utah State Bar.
that

the

forth substantial pieces of correspondence

between Mr. Barnard, the plaintiff herein, and
Bar,

improper

factual

particularly

situation

as

to

because

of

the

whether or not Mr.

Barnard would ever be provided with the names of

the

screening

panel

that had been assigned to hear the disciplinary complaint

filed

against

him,

that

the

Complaint

was

interposed

for

improper purposes, such as harassment.
Finally, the defendants suggest that there
any

was

lack

of

reasonable inquiry into the law, as required by Rule 11, in

that the plaintiff knew or should have known that
Court
to

a

District

lacked any jurisdiction with regard to matters pertaining

the

discipline

exclusive

of

jurisdiction

Supreme Court.
defect

the

attorneys,
for

such

but

rather

matters

original

and

rests with the Utah

At the very least, the plaintiff recognized

the

when he voluntarily dismissed this matter after filing a

writ seeking the same relief before the Utah Supreme Court.

BARNARD V. SUTLIFF
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Plaintiff argues by way of defense of
that

he

the

improper

has filed other matters in the District Court relating

to Bar issues, involving the discipline of attorneys,
those

matters

continue

to pend.

cases that the plaintiff refers
should

to

do

be

before

the

Court,

it

is

defense

jurisdiction

of

no

and

involve

Supreme

matters

Court

to

and

suggest

that

defendants

wit:

part

herein

of

in

this

the

would

be

Supreme Court in any event.
is

that

case.

plaintiff
required

a

In addition, it is no
to
to

The complaint

suggest

that

the

respond

before the

by

defendants

the

had a reasonable inquiry into the law been made by the

was

an

where

District

improper location for filing the claims asserted

in this suit, and that they
Court

the

filing

plaintiff, it would have been adamantly clear that the
Court

the

the District Court has been improperly invoked

to

defense on the

which

not

on prior occasions as a justification for an improper
time,

that

If, in fact, the two earlier

properly

District

third

filing

they

had

to

respond

in

the

District

would not have otherwise been required to do

so.
This

Court

is

satisfied

that

reasonable inquiry into the status
issues

of

had
of

Mr.

the

Barnard

law

made

pertaining

a
to

jurisdiction regarding the nature of the controversy

reflected in the present suit, that it

would

have

been

clear

BARNARD V, SUTLIFF
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that the District Court was

not

which

to

seek

relief.

On

an

MEMORANDUM DECISION

appropriate

forum

within

that basis, this Court determines

that the plaintiff has failed to make a proper inquiry, and
therefore

violated

Procedure.

Rule 11 mandates sanctions, and

that

would

have

Rule

any

11

of

legitimate

the

Utah

Rules

the

effect

on

of

only

of

the

plaintiff

in

the

future,

Civil

sanction

the plaintiff to

insure a reasonable inquiry as to the status of the law
part

and

to

on

case

improperly

the

restore the

defendants financially because of the requirement to respond
this

has

to

filed in the District Court, is an award

of attorney's fees.
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

this Court determines that the

defendants are entitled to their reasonable attorney's

fees

responding

The fact

to the plaintiff's Complaint filed herein.

that the defendants have not acted in a presumptuous fashion
filing

an

Affidavit

regarding

the

does

not

constitute

a

by

amount of fees until this

Court determined that they are entitled to fees, as it
done,

in

defect.

The

has

entitlement

now
to

attorney's fees is determined in this Memorandum Decision.
The
filing

amount
of

defendants,

an

of attorney's fees shall be determined upon the
appropriate

setting

forth

Affidavit
the

on

attorney's

the

part

fees

responding to the plaintiff's improvidently filed

of

incurred
lawsuit.

the
in
In

BARNARD V. SUTLIFF
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that regard, the Court would require that such an
filed

within

Decision.
shall

(10)

Upon the

have

the amount
detail

ten

filing

from the date of this Memorandum

of

attorney's

objections,

the

fees
if

fee should not be allowed.
any

be

Affidavit,

the

plaintiff

ten (10) days within which to file any Objection to
of

any

days

Affidavit

requested,

setting

forth

in

any, including the reasons why the

Upon receipt of

the

Affidavit

and

Objections that might be filed, the Court will consider the

amount of attorney's fees, and

if

necessary,

the

Court

will

request oral argument to be scheduled, as may be appropriate.
The Court would not require an Order
to

attorney's

fees

at

this

point

regarding

in

time, but rather will

require the defendants to prepare an appropriate
forth

the

issues

of

entitlement

Memorandum Decision, and the
might

be

determined

amount

following

the

as
of

entitlement

Order

determined

attorney's

filing

in

this

fees

that

of an appropriate

Affidavit.
Dated this 63

setting

day of February, 1990.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

of

I hereby certify that I mailed a true

and

the

to

this /?

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

correct

copy

the following,

day of February, 1990:

Brian M. Barnard
Pro se
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Robert H. Rees
Attorney for Defendants
175 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND. FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

890904670

vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants,

Before

the

Court

is

a

determination as to the amount of

attorney's fees due the defendants as a result of imposition
Rule

11

sanctions

against

the plaintiff, all as set forth by

this Court in its Memorandum

Decision

Also

the

before

the

Court

is

of

February

and

the

Affidavits

plaintiff in connection

of

with

12, 1990.

defendants' Motion to Strike

portions of the plaintiff's Objection to an award of
fees,

of

various

his

attorney's

attorneys filed by the

objection

to

an

award

of

attorney's fees.
The plaintiff has submitted a Notice to Submit for
as

to

While

his
there

Objection
is

no

Decision

relating to an award of attorney's fees.
formal

Notice

to

Submit

for Decision,

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
M
ALL-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO.
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defendants' Motion to Strike, it is an integral part of the

Objection to the amount of attorney's fees to
inasmuch

be

awarded,

and

as all parties have had an opportunity to address that

issue in Memoranda, it is Likewise ripe for decision.
Finally,
to his

the plaintiff has requested oral argument relating

Objection.

Argument

does

The

not

plaintiff

suggest

any

should grant the Request for Oral
determination

of

basis

his

Request

upon

Argument.

there

does

for oral argument.

a

submitted,

Inasmuch

as

the

not

appear

to

be

any

The Court does not believe that
that

have

would be of any benefit to the Court in making

determination

Accordingly,

Oral

which this Court

oral argument, particularly in view of the pleadings
been

for

the amount of attorney's fees is not a motion

considered "dispositive,"
requirement

in

as

the

to

the

amount

of

attorney's

fees.

Court denies the plaintiff's request for oral

argument, and will decide this matter based upon

the

pleadings

tnat have been filed.
Turning first to the
defendants

suggest

defendants'

that

a

Motion

to

substantial

portion

plaintiff's Objection and the plaintiff's Second
subject
Utah

to

Rules

defendants

a

Motion

of

Civil

further

to

The

of

the

Affidavit

are

Strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the

Procedure

suggest

Strike.

as

being

immaterial.

The

that the eight Affidavits filed by

BARNARD V. SUTLIFF
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in connection with his Objection to the award of

attorney's fees are also immaterial. The defendants base
assertion

of

immateriality

their

on the claim that the plaintiff is

merely attempting to introduce additional materials relating
the

question

was resolved

to

of entitlement of attorney's fees, an issue which
by

this

Court

in

its

Memorandum

Decision

of

February 12, 1990.
Plaintiff responds, claiming that it is his
the

amount

of

11

sanctions

should

position is misplaced.
entitlement,
the

guise

and

fees

apply

not

by

this

plaintiff

the

that

Plaintiff's

the

amount

of

should be zero, because the defendants are not

that

to

case.

that

The

attorney's

Court's
fees

Memorandum

were

establishing entitlement thereto only allows
object

finding

intend to revisit that issue under

the

entitled to attorney's fees.
determining

in

in

The Court clearly ruled on the issue of

does

suggested

attorney's

that

attorney's fees that should be awarded is zero,

based upon his assertion that the Court erred
Rule

position

amount

of

attorney's

Decision

appropriate
the

fees,

and

plaintiff

and

then

to

with

particularity, regarding amount.
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

the

Affidavits

submitted

by

attorneys John B. Maycock, Gary B. Ferguson, Mark S. Gustavson,
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Anderson,
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Breeze, James Ausenbaugh, G. Steven

Sullivan, and Kevin N. Anderson are stricken as immaterial.
addition,

paragraphs

2

through

subparts of the plaintiff's

13,

Second

including

Affidavit,

the

In

various

dated

February

26, 1990, are likewise stricken as immaterial.
Finally, the plaintiff's document styled "Objection,"
February

26,

1990

is

stricken,

with

the

exception

of the

of

attorney's

fees,

paragraph on page 6 addressing the amount
and

the

heading

last

sentence

"Conclusion,"

attorney's

fees

on

page

wherein

7 of the Objection under the

the

plaintiff

requested are excessive."

fees,

in

the

connection

aid

Court
with

"the

submitted

by

the

of his Objection to the amount of attorney's
declines

to

consider

that

information

in

a determination as to the amount of attorney's

fees to be awarded to the defendants.
rejects

opines,

Having stricken all

or part of the pleadings and other materials
plaintiff

dated

The

Court

specifically

the plaintiff's position that he is entitled to revisit

the issue of entitlement on the theory that no

attorney's

fees

should be awarded.
Turning to the principal issue before
the

amount

of

the

Court,

to wit:

attorney's fees to be awarded to the defendants

based upon this Court's prior finding

that

Rule

11

sanctions
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before

Attorney's Fees submitted by Robert H.
defendants.

Accompanying

that

it the Affidavit of

Rees,

counsel

in

the

the

Affidavit and included therein

is a computerized billing, showing services rendered,
thereof,

for

the

date

attorney rendering the service, the time involved

rendering

the

service,

and

the

dollar

amount

for

the

particular service.
A review of that itemized bill shows the Court
the

customary

attorney's

The

does

not

consider

the

defendants' counsel on behalf of
the

is

Memorandum

total

amount

fees billed to the defendants is $4,381.00. The

billing includes a statement for costs advanced,
Court

it

itemized billing used by attorneys practicing in

this community, billing on an hourly basis.
of

that

Decision

issue
the

dealing

of

however,

this

costs

advanced

by

defendants,

inasmuch

as

entitlement

of

with

the

attorney's fees limited itself to attorney's fees, and

did

not

make a determination that costs would be awarded.
In response to the amount of attorney's
the

defendants,

fees

by

the plaintiff has provided the Court with what

can best be described as a

conclusory

opinion,

the

excessive,

and

attorney's

requested

fees

amount requested could

are
not

reasonably

be

claiming

that

suggesting that the
necessary

for the
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defendants' counsel

their clients in responding to the plaintiff's
plaintiff

Complaint.

The

further suggests that this Court should not allow any

attorney's fees for time incurred or
the

on behalf of

Motion

for

services

rendered

as

to

Sanctions itself, but should limit an award of

attorney's fees, if any at all, to the defendants' pleadings

in

response to the original Complaint.
As to plaintiff's second
The

legal

Sanctions

fees
under

recoverable,

incurred
Rule

argument,
in

it

otherwise,

could

very

impossible for an aggrieved party to
11.

Abuses

under

Rule

11

should

form

of
of

surely

well

seek

rejected.

be

must

be

economically

redress

under

Rule

be brought to the Court's

attention when they occur, and not ignored
costs

be

pursuing a legitimate Motion for

11, or

otherwise

it must

merely

because

the

doing so might outweigh the potential recovery in the
attorney's

effectively

nullify

fees
the

gained.
policy

To

hold

reasons

otherwise

that

would

suggested

the

necessity of Rule 11 sanctions in the first instance.
In
Affidavit

determining
and

substantially

the

itemized
more

amount

billing

guidance

of

fees,

provides
as

to

the

the defendants'

the
proper

attorney's fees than does the plaintiff's conclusory

Court

with

amount

of

statements

BARNARD V, SUTLIFF

that

the

fees
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The plaintiff has neglected to

suggest to this Court any particular entries
are

excessive; he

has

failed

to

suggest

amount of attorney's fees might be for
nor

that

a

he

believes

what a reasonable

particular

service;

has he suggested that the hourly rate charged is excessive,

to the contrary, the evidence that this Court
from

hears

frequently

various lawyers practicing law in this community regarding

a range of reasonable
rates

claimed

by

hourly

the

rate

defendants

suggests
falls

that

into

the

the

hourly

range

of

reasonableness.
In

reviewing

the itemized statement of defendants' counsel

relating to legal services provided to the
matter,

the

Court

days where more
connection

in

this

notes that there are entries for particular

than

one

attorney

has

provided

service

in

with this case. A review of the materials submitted

does not suggest that
rather

defendants

the

work

was

merely

duplication, but

in view of defendants' counsel's Affidavit that the fees

set forth on the statement were all reasonably
incurred

in

representing

the

defendants

plaintiff's Complaint and in preparing
Sanctions.
plaintiff.

Nothing

to

the

contrary

in

and

necessarily

response to the

defendants' Motion

has been offered by the

Accordingly, this Court declines to assume that

work was duplication.

for

the

BARNARD V. SUTLIFF

Therefore,
defendant,
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considering

and

the

clearly

to

preponderates

adjust

proper evidence where
Court
is

determines

the

amount

fees

in

While

attorney's
nothing

submitted

by

the

submitted by the plaintiff that

attorney's

claim for attorney's fees.
leeway

materials

materials

relate to the amount of
evidence

the

MEMORANDUM DECISION

favor

this

fees
is

to

be

of

awarded,

the

the defendants'

Court

may

have

some

awarded, it can not ignore

offered

in

response.

The

that an appropriate amount of attorney's fees
requested

by

the

defendants,

and

awards

attorney's fees in the sum of $4,381.00.
Turning to the defendants' claim that this Court should
its

use

equitable powers to correct the plaintiff's perceived error

in the Court's prior Memorandum Decision, the Court declines
exercise

such

powers, even if the Rules of Procedure suggested

that such an approach would be proper under what
has

it

contains

any

Decision

substantive

was

mistakes.

attempt to relitigate issues of entitlement of
is

the

plaintiff

filed as an Objection, inasmuch as this Court is not of the

opinion that the prior Memorandum
that

to

improper.

plaintiff's
indicated

or
above

immaterial.

The

submission

non-party
in

the

of

error, or

The plaintiff's
attorney's

affidavits, whether

attorney's,
Court's

in

are

decision

The issue of entitlement was

out

of

striking

decided

on

time
them

fees
the
as
as

February
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1990, and an attempt to place additional evidence in front

of the Court by the plaintiff, now the losing party, is no more
proper

in

this

circumstance

than

it

would

be

if

a party

attempted to introduce evidence on appeal for the first time.
As

a

final observation regarding the issue of jurisdiction

which led to issuance of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure,

this

Court was and is hard pressed to accept

plaintiff's argument for jurisdiction of this type of matter
the

district

courts

when the plaintiff in filing his verified

petition for extraordinary writ (Supreme
asserted

that

in

Court

Number

890445)

the Supreme Curt has "exclusive jurisdiction" of

attorney discipline matters and "the action could not

be

in

regarding

District

Court,"

Plaintiff's

position

filed

jurisdiction appears to vary between the Supreme Court and

this

filing in the District Court.
Counsel

for

encompassing

the

the

Memorandum Decision
imposition

of

defendants

ruling
of

of

to

this

February

sanctions, and

is

12,
the

prepare

Court
1990

fees.

Court's

determination

as

In addition to the Order

to

its

dealing

Order

original
with

the

question of entitlement to

attorney's fees, and further to include in
this

in

an

the

dealing

the

proposed

amount
with

Order

of attorney's

the

entitlement
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fees, the defendants' counsel shall
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of

attorney's
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also prepare an appropriate Judgment in favor of the
and

against

the

plaintiff

awarded in the Order.

The

should

in

be

submitted

for

defendants

the amount of attorney's fees

aforementioned
accordance

Order

and

with the Code of Judicial

Administration.
Dated this

/y

Judgment

day of March, 1990.

VlliOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I
of the
this

hereby

certify

foregoing

that I mailed a true and correct copy

Memorandum

Decision,

to

/:5~dav of March, 1990:

Brian M. Barnard
Pro se
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Robert H. Rees
Attorney for Defendants
175 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314

/%L

the

following,

;

»PY

FILED DISTRICT COUHT
Third Judicial District

APR 2 3 13S0

CARMAN E. KIPP - #1829
ROBERT H. REES - #4125
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
(801)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Oeputy Clerk

521-3773

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AND FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEE

Plaintiff,
vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and UTAH
STATE BAR,

Civil No.

890904670

Defendants.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

On or about January

10, 1990, defendants filed a

motion for sanctions and for an attorney's fee pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.

Defendants are

represented by Carman E. Kipp and Robert H. Rees of the firm
of Kipp and Christian, P . C , and plaintiff Brian M. Barnard
represents
motion,

himself.

the

affidavit

The
of

court
Steven

considered
F.

defendants'

Hutchinson,

defendants' memorandum and reply memorandum

and

in support of

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
H
AU-STATC UGAt s u m v c o .

their

motion

court

also

for sanctions
considered

and

the

for attorney's

affidavit

of

fee.

The

plaintiff

and

plaintiff's response to the motion for sanctions and then
ruled by memorandum decision dated February

12, 1990 that

defendants are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees
pursuant to their motion based on Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The court then considered the affidavit of Robert
H. Rees and plaintiff's objection, the second affidavit of
plaintiff,
eight

plaintiff's

affidavits

request

for oral

defendants

request

filed

by

judicial

plaintiff,

argument.

filed a motion

for

notice,

together

On or about

March

to strike the eight

with

and
his

5, 1990,
affidavits

filed by plaintiff and portions of the second affidavit of
plaintiff and plaintiff's objection.

The court considered

defendants' motion to strike and their memorandum in support
of

that motion and plaintiff's response to the motion to

strike together with plaintiff's second request for judicial
notice.

The court

then

entered

dated March 14, 1990.

its memorandum

decision
j

Based upon this court's memorandum decisions dated
February 12, 1990 and March 14, 1990, having considered all
of the materials indicated above submitted by the parties,

-2-

and

being

fully advised,

the

court

now hereby orders as

follows:
1.

Plaintifffs request for oral argument relating

to his objection is denied.
2.
the

Defendants" motion

affidavits

Ferguson,

Mark

submitted
S.

by

to strike is granted

John

Gustavson,

Ross

B.

Maycock,

C.

Gary

Anderson,

and
B.

Robert

Breeze, James Ausenbaugh, G. Steven Sullivan, and Kevin N.
Anderson and paragraphs 2-13 of plaintiff's second affidavit
and all of

plaintiff's objection

except

paragraph

the

on

page

dated

February

6 addressing

26, 1990

the amount of

attorney's fees and the last sentence on page 7 under the
heading

"Conclusion" where

the plaintiff states that

"the

attorney's fees requested are excessive" are stricken.
3.

Defendants1 motion

for sanctions pursuant to

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is granted and
defendants

are

awarded

attorney's

fees

in

the

$4,381.00.

Judgment should be entered against plaintiff in

favor of defendants in that amount.
DATED this c><jLjday of Ma*efr, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
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sum

of

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
1990,

a

Regarding

true

and

correct

Defendants1

copy

Motion

of
for

[Vl.
\ * ^day
7

the

of March,

foregoing

Sanctions

Order

and

for
i

Attorney's Fee was HAND DELIVERED to the following:

Brian M, Barnard
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111-3204

FtlED BiSTFi'.C! COURT
Third Judicial District

CARMAN E. KIPP - #1829
ROBERT H. REES - #4125
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
(801) 521-3773

APR 2 3 1990
SALT I AKE COUNTY
By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

J U D G M E N T

TONI M. SUTLIFF and UTAH
STATE BAR,

Civil No. 890904670

Defendants.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Based upon this court's order awarding defendants
their
hereby

attorney's fees
enters

in the sum of $4,381.00, the court

judgment

in

favor

of

defendants

against

plaintiff in the sum of $4,381.00.
DATED this <=»<^aay of MaJch-, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/ Z^day

of March,

1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was
HAND DELIVERED to the following:

Brian M. Barnard
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111-3204

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

:

Civil No. 89-0904670

:

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS
(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court
on the plaintiff's Request for Oral Arguments, the plaintiff's Motion to Enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and the plaintiffs Motion to Stay Proceedings, the parties having
submitted written memorandums, the matter having been
submitted under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, and the
Court having fully considered the arguments and representations of counsel, based thereon and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
The plaintiff's request for oral argument is denied;
The plaintiff's motion to stay proceedings is denied;

f

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

The plaintiff's motion to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law is denied; and,
The plaintiff's motion for a new trial is denied.
DATED this

day of APRIL, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of APRIL, 1990, I
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
pleading ORDER DENYING MOTIONS to:
ROBERT REES
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 4th South
# 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service.

by< SJMlUnUi ^ / / / M ,

2

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111 - 3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,

vs.
TONI M. SUTLIFF and
UTAH STATE BAR,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

:

Civil No. 89-0904670

:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
(Hon. T.R. HANSON)

THE PLAINTIFF, BRIAN M. BARNARD hereby gives notice of
his appeal of that certain Order (April 23, 1990) and
Judgment (April 23, 1990) entered in the above captioned
matter granting attorney fees and sanctions under Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further appeals the Court's denial (May 2f
1990) of his motion for a new trial on said issue.
This appeal is to the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 1990.

PLAINTIFF'S I
. EXHIBIT
AUSTATt UGAl SUTtlV CO.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of MAY, 1990, I
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
pleading NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
ROBERT REES
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Defendants
175 East 4th South
// 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff

2

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Art. VIH f

Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of supreme court]
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United
States. The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs
and orders necessaryforthe exercise of the supreme court's jurisdiction or the
complete determination of any cause.

Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of supreme court — Judges
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.]
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in
the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
legislature may amend the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the
supreme court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the supreme
court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore
to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The
supreme court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to
practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law.

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the supreme
court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
R

A l l iTATI i S O A i 9UPP1V COL

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(it) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer jto the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over "which* the* Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (0.
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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78-3-4, Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court —
Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of
the district court in multiple judge districts, or the district court judge in
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upon the
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced
in the circuit court and any appeals fromfinaljudgments shall be to the Court
of Appeals.
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district
court are under Sections 78*2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency adjudicative pro*
ceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63, and shall comply with the
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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